Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Hence, the effects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. Similarly to a durable goods monopolist, a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against herself. This forces her to partially relinquish control over the information flow to traders. Conversely, an insider solves the intertemporal competition problem through vertical integration, thus exerting a tighter control over the flow of information. Comparing market patterns I show that a dynamic market where information is provided by an analyst is thicker and more informative than one where an insider trades.
The analyst thus acts in a way that is much akin to the durable goods monopolist that, being forced to sell rather than rent, handles her intertemporal self-competition problem strategically choosing the quality of the goods she markets; the insider, on the other hand, attenuates competition through vertical integration: the producer and the final user of the information good, in his case, coincide.
1 Comparing market patterns, the insider's tighter control over the information flow makes the market in the second period thinner and prices less informative than those that obtain in the analyst's market. In a dynamic market, therefore, trading by an insider worsens stock price accuracy and impairs market depth compared to a market where information is provided by an analyst. Several papers analyze dynamic trading in markets with asymmetric information and assess the relevance of information flows in determining the behavior of market
patterns. Yet, in all of these works the information flow is either exogenously given, as if traders were born endowed with their private signals, or determined by traders' endogenous decisions to acquire signals of a given constant precision.
2 However, as information is a valuable good, its distribution is likely to depend on the decisions of agents who, given traders' time-varying desire to become informed, optimally set the quality of the signals they release. If this is the case, then the dynamic properties of a market should be analyzed by explicitly modeling such decisions.
In this paper I take a first step at addressing this issue by studying a dynamic asset market with risk-averse, competitive agents, in which control over the information flow is exerted by a monopolistic analyst selling long-lived information. In every period the analyst optimally chooses the quality of the information she distributes to the agents in the asset market. Within this framework, I characterize the optimal solution to the analyst's intertemporal profit maximization problem and investigate how this affects agents' trading behavior and the dynamic properties of the asset market. This has an independent interest since, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that provides such an analysis within a discrete-time, dynamic rational expectations goods monopolist, by renting manages to keep up the price of the good he supplies, extracting a higher surplus from consumers. Similarly, an insider by exerting a tighter control over the information flow, manages to keep up market thinness, extracting higher rents from liquidity traders. 6 A legislation designed to effectively curb insider trading may thus facilitate the transmission of fundamental information into prices.
This, in turn, may eventually enhance the efficiency of the market and reduce the market impact of trades, implying lower trading costs and improving market liquidity.
Finally, this work also contributes to the literature on financial markets information sales. This has mainly focused on the static problem faced by a monopolistic information provider selling signals either directly, as in the case of an investment advisor, or indirectly, as in the case of a mutual fund (see Admati and Pfleiderer 1986 , 1988a ). Fishman and Hagerty (1995) show that a strategic agent can use information sales as a commitment device to trade aggressively against a symmetrically informed peer. Allen (1990) shows that the credibility problem faced by an information seller needing to prove his access to superior information may leave room for financial intermediaries to appropriate part of the seller's information value. Simonov (1999) studies the effect of competition among analysts in the Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) 's context, showing that externalities in information transmission may lead to counterintuitive results. 7 Little attention has been devoted to study the dynamics of the information sales problem. A notable exception is represented by Naik (1997) who studies the single-shot problem of an analyst selling a flow of information in a continuous time model. However, as in Naik the analyst's decision is made "once-and-for-all," no intertemporal competition problem arises there.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the static benchmark where I review the results of Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) and prove that in a static setup a market where information is sold by a monopolistic analyst and one where an insider trades generate the same patterns of depth and price informativeness. In section 3 I present the 2-period model with long-lived information and in section 4 I study the analyst's optimal sales policy. In section 5 I compare patterns of depth and price informativeness across the two markets and analyze numerically the properties of the general N > 2-period model. Finally, in section 6 I discuss the effects of market segmentation and public announcements on the analyst's control of 6 Incidentally, this argument provides a formalization to Carlton and Fischel (1983) 's intuition that an insider is better able to control the flow of information generated within the firm. Furthermore, it shows that such control comes at the cost of a thinner and less efficient market.
7 Recently, García and Vanden (2005) analyze competition among mutual funds.
the information flow. A final section contains concluding remarks while most of the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The Static Benchmark
Consider a market where a single risky asset with liquidation value v ∼ N (v, τ −1 v ) and a riskless asset with unitary return are traded. In this market competitive speculators or an insider trade along with noise traders against a competitive, risk-neutral market making sector.
In the former case there is a continuum of informed traders in the interval [0, 1].
Every informed trader i (potentially) receives a signal s i = v+ i , where i ∼ N (0, τ −1 ), v and i are independent and errors are also independent across agents. Let the informed traders' preferences over final wealth W i be represented by a CARA utility function U (W i ) = − exp{−W i /γ}, where γ > 0 denotes the coefficient of constant absolute risk tolerance and W i = X i (v − p) indicates the profit of buying X i units of the asset at price p.
In the market with the insider, a risk-neutral, strategic agent holds a perfect signal about the liquidation value v and trades a quantity X I to maximize his expected final wealth.
In both markets noise traders submit a random demand u (independent of all other random variables in the model), with u ∼ N (0, τ −1 u ). Finally, assume that in the competitive market, given v, the average signal 1 0 s i di equals v almost surely (i.e. errors cancel out in the aggregate:
The Equilibrium in the Competitive Market
In this section I present a version of the traditional large-market noisy rational expectations equilibrium market, as studied by Admati (1985) , Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Hellwig (1980), and Vives (1995a) .
To find the equilibrium in this market, assume that each informed trader submits a price contingent order X i (s i , p) specifying the desired position in the risky asset for any price p and restrict attention to linear equilibria where X i (s i , p) = as i − bp.
Competitive, risk-neutral market makers observe the aggregate order flow L(p) = 1 0 X i (s i , p)di + u = av + u − bp and set a semi-strong efficient price. If we let z C = av + u denote the informational content of the order flow, then the following result applies:
Proposition 1 In the competitive market there exists a unique linear equilibrium. It is symmetric and given by
Proof. See Admati (1985) and Vives (1995a) . QED Intuitively, an informed speculator's trading aggressiveness a increases in the precision of his private signal and in the risk tolerance coefficient. Market makers' reaction to the presence of informed speculators λ C = aτ u /τ is captured by the OLS regression coefficient of the unknown payoff value on the order flow. As is common in this literature, λ C measures the reciprocal of market depth (see e.g., Kyle 1985 and Vives 1995a) , and its value determines the extent of noise traders' ex-
u . The informativeness of the equilibrium price is measured by the reciprocal of the payoff conditional variance given the order flow:
The higher τ C , the smaller the uncertainty on the true payoff value once the order-flow has been observed.
The Equilibrium in the Strategic Market
The linear equilibrium of the strategic market is given by the well known result due to Kyle (1985) . Assume the insider submits a linear market order X I (v) = α + βv to the market making sector indicating the desired position in the risky asset. 8 Upon observing the aggregate order flow z I = x I + u, market makers set the semi-strong efficient equilibrium price. Restricting attention to linear equilibria, the following result holds:
Proposition 2 In the strategic market there exists a unique linear equilibrium given
Proof. See Kyle (1985) . QED
Owing to camouflage opportunities, the insider's aggressiveness β is larger (smaller), the more (less) dispersed is the distribution of noise traders' demand. Conversely, market makers' reaction to the presence of the insider (λ I ) is harsher (softer) the more concentrated is the demand of noise traders. A noisier market thus spurs a more aggressive insider's trading; owing to the insider's risk-neutrality, these two countervailing effects exactly cancel out. As a consequence, price informativeness does not depend on τ u and is given by τ I = 2τ v .
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The Information Market
Suppose now as in Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) that the private signal each trader observes in the competitive asset market is sold by a monopolistic buy-side analyst who has a perfect knowledge of the asset pay-off realization.
10 Furthermore, assume that (i) the analyst does not trade on the information she sells, and (ii) she truthfully provides the information she promises to traders. The last assumption clearly simplifies the analysis. Indeed, recent research has outlined the tendency displayed by sell-side analysts to provide biased information. However, differently from their sell-side counterparts, buy-side analysts privately provide investment advice services to their clients (mutual funds and pension funds). Therefore, absent the need to preserve privileged access to companies' information, they are unlikely to feel the pressure towards issuing public investment recommendations that please firms' managers. Furthermore, their firms do not perform investment banking or brokerage services. Hence, their research output is likely to be less biased than the one provided by sell-side analysts.
11
The error affecting each trader's signal can be thought as an interpretation mistake that the trader commits when processing the information he receives (see Admati and Pfleiderer 1986 ). An analyst providing vague predictions embeds a low precision τ in the signal she sells. The lower (higher) is τ , the more (less) vague is the analyst's information release, and the more (less) is each trader's information likely to be incorrectly interpreted. Given that the analyst holds all the bargaining power, in order to receive information each trader i pays a price that makes him indifferent
9 Subrahmanyam (1991) shows that if the insider is risk-averse, this result does not hold. 10 Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) also consider the case in which the analyst is not perfectly informed. While the static case can be handled under such assumption, the dynamic extension I consider in section 4 quickly becomes intractable.
11 Sell-side analysts working at investment banks and brokerage firms are likely to face a conflict of interests mainly for three reasons. First, they may tip investors towards buying stock of a current or potential investment banking client. Also, they may provide over optimistic research results to boost brokerage commissions. Finally, as their access to relevant information often depends on contacts with firms' insiders, they may be unwilling to provide negative information on a firm in order not to compromise such contacts. See Cheng, Liu, and Qian (2004) and Groysberg, Healy, Chapman, and Gui (2005) .
between observing or not the signal s i . Denoting by φ such a price
Standard normal calculations show that
where
Thus, each trader pays a price which is a monotone transformation of the informational advantage he acquires over market makers by observing the signal. The analyst faces a trade-off: on the one hand she would like to make each trader's informational advantage as large as possible, increasing τ and thus τ iC . On the other hand, as each trader's speculative aggressiveness is directly related to his signal's precision, increasing τ enhances price efficiency (τ C ), and thus reduces the signal's value. Maximizing (2.1) with respect to τ the analyst finds the precision that optimally balances the above offsetting effects:
Hence, the analyst sells a signal that is more (less) informative the higher (lower)
is the unconditional noise-to-signal ratio and the more risk-averse the traders arepoorer ex-ante information and/or noisier markets allow the analyst to release less vague predictions.
Note thatτ minimizes λ −1 C . The intuition is straightforward: the analyst seeks to extract the maximum aggregate surplus from informed traders. Such surplus, in turn, increases in the informational advantage traders have vis-à-vis market makers.
When such advantage is maximal, market depth is at its minimum, and traders are also willing to pay the highest price.
Furthermore, according to (2.2), the equilibrium market parameters replicate those obtained in the strategic market of the previous section. Indeed, the aggregate trading aggressiveness a = 1 0 a di = τ v /τ u ; thus, price informativeness
, and the reciprocal of market depth λ C = (1/2) τ u /τ v = λ I .
Summarizing:
Proposition 3 In the static information market, the analyst sells a signal with precisionτ = (1/γ) τ v /τ u ; such information quality minimizes market depth replicating the equilibrium properties of an asset market with a single, risk-neutral insider.
The equivalence between the analyst's and the insider's problems can be best understood by rewriting (2.1) as follows:
The analyst who wishes to maximize her expected profits chooses a signal qualitŷ τ such that the stock market is as thin as possible. In this way she maximizes the aggregate rents she extracts from competitive traders which, given the "zero-sum" nature of the market game, are just the flip side of the coin of noise traders' expected losses. However, this is the same result obtained in a market with a risk-neutral insider that in equilibrium sees his ex-ante profits (i.e. the expected losses of noise traders) maximized when the impact of his trades (as measured by λ I ) is as large as possible.
12 Therefore, in a static information market, the way in which a perfectly informed agent conveys fundamental information to the market does not matter.
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A Dynamic Asset Market with Long Lived Information
Consider now a 2-period extension of the market analyzed in the previous section.
In particular, assume that assets are traded for two periods and that in period 3 the risky asset is liquidated and the value v collected (thus, p 3 = v).
In the competitive market, every informed trader i in each period n (potentially) receives a private signal s in = v + in , where in ∼ N (0, τ −1 n ), v and in are independent, and errors are also independent across agents and periods (therefore private information is "long lived"). Assume that a trader i's preferences over final wealth W i3 are represented by a CARA utility function U (W i3 ) = − exp{−W i3 /γ}, where W i3 = In the strategic market, before the first period, the insider observes v and then chooses X In , in every period n to maximize his expected final wealth.
In both markets noise traders demand follows an independently and identically normally distributed process {u n } 2 n=1 (independent of all other random variables in the model), with u n ∼ N (0, τ −1 u ) in every period n. Finally, assume that in the competitive market given v and for every n, the average signal 
The Equilibrium in the Dynamic Competitive Market
Let us indicate with s n i and p n respectively, the sequence of private signals and prices a trader has observed up to period n. In every period n = 1, 2 an informed trader submits a price contingent order X in (s n i , p n−1 , ·) indicating the position desired in the risky asset at every price p n . Restricting attention to linear equilibria it is possible to show that the strategy of an agent i in period n de-
and on the sequence of equilibrium prices: 
indicates the informational content of period n net order flow, and set a semistrong efficient equilibrium price conditional on past and current information p n =
14 Proposition 4 In the 2-period competitive market, there exists a unique linear equilibrium. The equilibrium is symmetric and given by X in (s
Proof. See Vives (1995a) . QED
In every period n an informed trader speculates according to the sum of the precisions of his private signals weighted by the risk tolerance coefficient; market makers observe the (net) aggregate order flow and set the semi-strong efficient price p n attributing weight λ Cn = ∆a n τ u /τ Cn to its informational content z Cn = ∆a n v +u n .
14 It can be shown that in every linear equilibrium, the sequences p n and z n C are observationally equivalent (see Vives, 1995a) .
The information impounded in the equilibrium price is thus reflected in the public
The Equilibrium in the Dynamic Strategic Market
Assume that in every period n the insider submits a linear market order X In ( Proposition 5 In the 2-period strategic market there exists a unique linear equilibrium given by X In (v, p n−1 ) = β n (v − p n−1 ) and p n = λ In z In + p n−1 , n = 1, 2, where
Proof. See Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) . QED As more information is impounded in the price, the severity of the adverse selection problem decreases, and market makers set a less steep price schedule: λ I2 < λ I1 . As a consequence, profit opportunities decline, and the insider turns to a more aggressive trading behavior: β 2 > β 1 .
A Dynamic Market for Information
In this section I use the results of section 3.1 to determine the optimal policy of the information provider. This is done in two steps: first, I obtain a trader i's value for the sequence of signals {s i1 , s i2 }; second, I solve for the analyst's optimal information sales policy.
The Value of Long Lived Information
As done in section 2, assume now that the signal each trader receives in every period n is sold by a monopolistic analyst who has perfect knowledge of the asset pay-off realization v, and does not trade on such information. Furthermore, assume the analyst truthfully provides the information she promises to each trader. As in every period n she extracts all the surplus, the analyst sets the price φ n for the signal s in equal to value that leaves the trader indifferent between acquiring or not the signal:
Proposition 6 In the 2-period information market, the maximum price a trader i is willing to pay to buy a signal s in in each period n = 1, 2 is given by φ 1 , φ 2 , where
Proof. See the appendix. QED
The first period signal price is the sum of two components capturing the trader's informational advantage vis-à-vis market makers that the signal allows in the first and in the second period. The intuition is as follows. In period 1 a trader buys s i1 and establishes a position in the risky asset X i1 (s i1 , p 1 ). The expected utility of his final wealth then depends on the position X i1 (·) (times the return from buying/selling the asset at p 1 and liquidating it at v) plus the change in the first period position he will eventually make at time two (times the return from changing the position at p 2 and liquidating such change at v). However, the latter component depends on the change in price which, in turn, depends on the arrival of private information in period two. As the trader cannot anticipate such "new" information in period one, his expected utility from acquiring s i1 depends only on the informational advantage the signal gives him in that period:
15 Indeed, absent a price change that informed traders cannot anticipate in period one, it would be suboptimal to establish a position X i1 and already plan to change it in period two. makes him indifferent between having and not having the signal:
The signal s i1 has however an added value, as it allows the trader to keep an informational advantage in the second period as well when the analyst sells the second signal (without having to buy a second signal). Such added value is given by the price the trader would be ready to pay in order to have s i1 and observe {p 1 , p 2 }:
In the second period, as a signal has already been sold, the trader compares the precision of the forecast she obtains from buying one additional signal to the one she gets from not buying it and using both period's prices and the first period signal.
Remark 1
The solution proposed in proposition 6 generalizes Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) . In particular, if τ 2 = 0, then φ 1 = φ as no new information is released by the analyst in period two, and thus the first period signal has no "added" value.
The Analyst's Optimal Policy
As argued in section 2.3, in order to make information sales profitable, the analyst "adds" some noise to the information she possesses. Thus, in a dynamic setup, in every period n the analyst chooses the precision τ n of the normal random variable n from which the error term is drawn.
Using the expressions for the price of information obtained in proposition 6 and starting from the second period, given any τ 1
which gives as a unique positive solution
Note that τ * 2 has the same functional form asτ . However, τ * 2 >τ . Indeed, given any τ 1 , the analyst's second period profit maximization problem is similar to the one she faces in the static market. However, as the precision of the information traders hold before buying the second period signal (i.e. τ iC1 ) is strictly higher than the one they hold prior to acquiring information in a static market (i.e. τ v ), the signal quality the analyst chooses in the former case must be strictly higher than the one she sets in the latter.
In the first period the analyst then chooses τ 1 to solve
The next proposition characterizes the solution to (4.5), comparing it with the static benchmark.
Proposition 7 In the 2-period information market, there exists a unique sequence of optimal signal precisions {τ * 1 , τ * 2 } that solves the analyst's profit maximization problem, where
In a dynamic market an analyst is faced with two problems: first, and similarly to the one-shot information sales case, she needs to take into account the negative effect that the price externality induced by the sale of information has on both period profits.
16 Second, and differently from the one-shot case, she faces an intertemporal self-competition problem. As a durable goods monopolist (Bulow 1982 , 1986 , and Coase 1972 once the first signal has been sold to informed traders, in order to make a new signal palatable to potential buyers, she must render partially obsolete the first period signal. The analyst thus scales down the quality of the first period information, and increases the quality of the information sold in the second period.
16 In this case the problem is actually worsened by the compound negative effects that the first period signal sale has on first and second period profits. quality she solves
for any given first period signal quality τ 1 . Thus, the price traders are willing to pay in order to get s i2 captures the informational advantage they have in the second period vis-à-vis market makers net of the informational advantage they would have holding s i1 and observing both period equilibrium prices {p 1 , p 2 }. 17 To maximize her profit, the analyst has thus an incentive to market a signal that in a way "kills-off" the second-hand market for the first period signal. 18 She does so by selling a signal whose precision τ * 2 is strictly higher than the precision of the first period signal.
Going back to period one, the analyst now faces the following problem:
As in the static case, she is interested in choosing a signal that makes the first period market as thin as possible. However, she must now take into account two additional contrasting effects. Increasing the first period signal precision allows traders to grab a higher share of second period noise traders' losses and this, in turn, increases the price they are willing to pay to get s i1 . On the other hand, a higher first period signal precision inevitably increases second period market depth, thus reducing the size of the second period rents the analyst can extract from traders. As the second effect is stronger than the first, the analyst chooses τ * 1 <τ .
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Therefore, the analyst sells a pair of signals that impoverishes first period information quality while consistently enhancing second period private information. As long lived information is a durable good that cannot be rented, the analyst needs to 17 We can interpret the term (γ/2) ln(τ iC2 /τ C2 ) as the gross informational advantage traders have in the second period vis-à-vis market makers.
18 The expression "second-hand" market here is used by way of analogy with the durable goods monopolist literature. Actually, traders do not resell their signals. However, we can always interpret the fact that traders are able to use in period two the signal they acquired in period one, as a second-hand market in which each trader resells to himself the signal previously acquired.
19 An alternative intuition for this result is the following one. When setting τ * 1 the analyst tries to extract as much surplus as possible from traders but at the same time she also tries to limit the competition she expects to face in the second period owing to the information traders bought in period one. As a result, she scales down the quality of the first period signal.
force the obsolescence of her first period signal. She does so combining a low first period signal quality (hence, reducing the product durability as in Bulow 1986 ) and introducing high second period signal quality (hence, marketing a new product that makes the old one obsolete as in Waldman 1993) .
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Denote by φ 1 (τ * 1 ), φ 2 (τ * 1 ), respectively the optimal price of the first and second period signal and with φ(τ ) the optimal price in the static market. The next proposition derives the implications of the optimal solution for the price of information and the depth of the market.
Proposition 8 The information allocation chosen by the analyst prescribes that
Therefore, while the price of private information decreases across trading periods, depth increases.
As the analyst kills-off the second-hand market for the first period signal, traders' net informational advantage vis-à-vis market makers decreases and the price they are willing to pay to buy s i2 ends up being lower than the one they pay to get s i1 . The flip side of the coin is that the adverse selection problem faced by market makers becomes less severe and market depth increases.
Remark 2 Increasing patterns of market depth have been documented at the interdaily level by the empirical finance literature (see Foster and Viswanathan 1993) . Theoretical explanations of this phenomenon have always been related to the strategic trading of insiders facing some form of competitive pressure, that speeds-up the market makers' learning process. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) show that a single insider is forced to spend his informational advantage at a faster pace than he would otherwise do, owing to the presence of impending public information. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) consider a market where the competition among symmetrically informed insiders forces more aggressive trading and a faster unfolding of 20 The signal durability here refers to the need that traders have to acquire additional information over time. To be sure, a fully revealing signal is infinitely durable (as it kills traders' need to receive further information in the future), while an infinitely noisy signal is infinitely perishable (as it does not affect traders' demand for additional information). the underlying uncertainty. According to this paper, in contrast, increasing levels of depth may be entirely compatible with an asset market where no trader has market power, and forthcoming public information poses no threat to informed traders' speculative abilities. In such a market, instead, the information flow is controlled by a monopolistically informed agent who, owing to the nature of the information she sells, intertemporally competes against herself.
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Insider Trading and Information Sales
We are now ready to contrast the dynamic properties of the competitive market where information is sold with those of the market with a strategic trader. An immediate consequence of proposition 5 is the following:
Proposition 9 In the 2-period asset market:
Proof. See the appendix. QED Therefore, as opposed to the static market result, in a dynamic market an insider induces different patterns for second period depth and price informativeness.
In particular, as he directly uses his informational advantage, he avoids the effect of intertemporal self-competition, fully internalizes the negative effect of aggressive speculation, and trades less intensely. This, in turn, makes the second period market thinner and its price less informative.
22
21 Therefore, as in the literature on vertical control (Tirole, 1988 ) -where consumers may face a competitive industry controlled by a monopolistic supplier of the intermediate good influencing the price of the final good -here we can think of liquidity traders as facing a sector of competitive traders whose behavior is controlled by a monopolistic supplier of information exerting a (partial) control over market depth.
22 A simple intuition for this result -although only partially correct since trading aggressiveness differ across the equilibria in the two markets -is the following one. Owing to intertemporal competition, the informativeness of the second period price induced by the analyst is given by
while, according to proposition 5, an insider trades in a way that second period public precision is "only" twice as high as in the first period.
The insider's second period problem is akin to the problem he faces in the static market. The equilibrium solution prescribes that he trades in a way to minimize second period market depth. The information monopolist, instead, chooses the second period information quality to minimize second period depth but, as argued above, also to minimize the second period value competitive traders attach to their first period signal. To see this, rewrite (4.4) as follows
Therefore, τ 2 must make noise traders' second period expected losses as large as possible while slashing the information advantage traders have in the second period thanks to the signal they bought in period 1. As (τ C2 /(τ C2 +τ 1 )) is strictly decreasing in τ 1 , this forces the analyst to sell a signal whose precision is strictly higher than the one minimizing (1/λ C2 ).
According to proposition 9 and differently from proposition 3, in a dynamic market the way through which a monopolistically informed agent conveys information about the fundamentals to the market does matter. In particular, whether such information is exploited directly or sold to competitive traders changes the patterns of depth and price efficiency. In contrast to the view according to which insider trading improves the accuracy of stock prices (see e.g., Carlton and Fischel 1983, and Manne 1966) , the above result shows instead that a single insider can exploit his monopolistic position in such a way as to choose the rate at which the market learns the fundamental, in this way impairing second period liquidity and price efficiency.
Conversely, a monopolistic analyst, owing to intertemporal competition, loses control over the information flow and speeds up the market learning process. In the spirit of the durable goods monopolist interpretation, the insider thus acts in a way that is much akin to the monopolistic producer that rents instead of selling. Indeed, the monopolistic renter fully internalizes the negative effect of overproduction by keeping the ownership of the goods he markets and thus cuts back on the quantities he releases.
The insider, on the other hand, by holding on to his informational advantage, directly bears the negative effects of an excessively aggressive behavior, and speculates less intensely.
Remark 3 As noted in proposition 7 in the first period the analyst reduces the quality of the information she sells. It is easy to show that this makes first period depth and price informativeness in the competitive market lower than in the strategic market. As I will argue in the next section, this result only affects the first period:
when N > 2 numerical simulations show that starting from the second round of trade, the competitive market is always deeper than the strategic market; furthermore, price informativeness in the competitive market is always higher than in the strategic market for all n = 1, 2, . . . N .
The General N -Period Information Market
The intuition gained in the previous section shows that in a dynamic market an insider is able to retain strong control over the information leakage produced by his trades. Conversely, an analyst facing intertemporal competition, is forced to give up most of such control to information buyers. If that is the case, as the number of trading rounds increases this lack of control should be exacerbated.
In this section, I compare the multiperiod versions of the 2-period market of section 3.2. As is well known, both the results in propositions 4, and 5 can be generalized to an arbitrary number of periods N > 2 (see, respectively Vives 1995a, and Kyle 1985) . Building on these extensions, consider now the general, N ≥ 2-period case and suppose that in every period n the analyst sells a signal of a different (conditional) precision τ n , charging a price φ n . The next proposition gives an explicit expression for φ n , generalizing proposition 6. Proposition 10 In the N ≥ 2-period information market, the maximum price φ n an agent i is willing to pay to buy a signal s in in each period n is given by
Thus, in the N -period market, in every period n a signal is useful both because of the increase in informational advantage it allows a trader to hold in the same period n (the first term in the above expression) and because of the increase in the informational advantage it determines in every future period k = n + 1, n + 2, . . . , N (the second term).
Given any trading length N , the last period optimal precision is thus given by
into every period n's profit function, shows that the analyst solves a sequence of maximization problems such that at every time n = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 she chooses
, given the sequence {τ * t } N −1 t=n+1 . Using the above expression for the value of information I run numerical simulations for the case N = 4. The aim is to verify that the results obtained in proposition 9 still hold when the number of trading rounds increases. Letting τ v , τ u , γ ∈ {.2, .4, .6, .8, 1, 4, 6}, in all of the simulations the analyst induces a more aggressive traders' behavior than that displayed by the insider. Hence, the effect of intertemporal competition leads the analyst to lose control over the information flow, whereas the insider, lacking competitive pressure, can trade less aggressively. As a result from the second trading round onwards, the competitive market is more liquid than the strategic market (see figure 1 ).
[ As to price informativeness, the numerical simulations show that the competitive market leads to a more rapid resolution of the fundamentals' uncertainty than the strategic market starting from the first trading round. The intuition is straightforward: as the number of trading rounds increases, traders are willing to pay a higher price for the first period signal. This, in turn, shifts upwards the information quality supplied by the analyst, thus increasing competitive traders' aggressiveness (see figure 2).
[ Figure 2 about here.]
Extensions
In order to increase her grip over the information flow, the analyst may want to consider two different strategies. She may try and segment the first period information market, so to reduce the fraction of traders that already possess a signal in the second period. Also, she may want to publicly release some information at the beginning of period two in order to reduce the informational advantage that traders have acquired in period one. Both strategies attempt to reduce the competitive pressure the analyst faces in the second period. However, as shown in this section, none of them can increase the analyst's profit.
Market Segmentation
Consider an extension of the 2-period market analyzed in section 3 in which every informed trader i in each period n (potentially) receives a private signal
). All the remaining assumptions are kept as in section 3. Under these conditions, the following result holds:
23
Proposition 11 In the 2-period competitive market, there exists a unique linear equilibrium. The equilibrium is given by X in (s
Cn , and
Therefore, the heterogeneity of signals' precisions is reflected into traders' speculative aggressiveness. In the above market the analyst may decide to provide each trader with a signal of a different precision. The following proposition shows that this is never optimal:
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Proposition 12 In the 2-period information market with heterogeneous signal precision, in every period n = 1, 2 the analyst sells to all traders a signal of the same precision.
The proof is based on two arguments. First, notice that in every period n = 1, 2 price informativeness τ Cn only depends on informed agents' average signal precision.
Thus, τ Cn is invariant with respect to a distribution of signals' precisions that leaves its average unchanged. Next, in the first period the analyst's objective function is concave in the informational advantage each trader holds over market makers in every period n (τ iCn /τ Cn ). Thus, owing to Jensen's inequality, given two information allocations yielding the same average total precision, in every period n the analyst obtains a higher profit when she sells to all traders a signal with the same precision (thus providing all traders with the same private precision) than when she sells signals with diverse precisions. It then follows that in every optimal information allocation, τ iC1 is the same across all traders, and τ * A direct implication of the above argument, is that the analyst never finds it profitable to segment the market -i.e. to sell information of precision τ * 1 > 0 (τ * 1 = 0) to a fraction 0 < µ < 1 (1 − µ) of traders in the first period. Indeed, such information allocation is dominated by one in which all traders in the first period receive a signal of precision µτ * 1 . Intuitively, market segmentation yields two contrasting effects. On the one hand, by reducing the fraction of traders that receive information in the first period, the analyst faces a reduced pressure to sell a better signal in the second period, as part of the population that buys information in the second period holds no previous signal. This, in turn, slows down information devaluation, increasing the analyst's profit. On the other hand, since equilibrium prices reflect fundamental information, the value that each trader assigns to a signal in the second period -after having observed the price sequence -is lower. This, in turn, limits the price that the analyst can extract from those traders that did not receive a signal in the first period. As the second effect is always stronger than the first, market segmentation never pays.
Public Disclosure
In a large market with differential information, disclosing to each trader i the signal each trader j has received (j = i) is practically unfeasible. A possible way out is for the analyst to reveal the aggregate signal she sold to traders in the first period (namelȳ
. Notice, however, that given the analyst's perfect knowledge of the fundamental v, such a strategy leads to complete information revelation, preventing the sale of a new signal in period 2.
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Based on these considerations, I address the issue of information disclosure in the following way: suppose that at the beginning of period 2 the analyst discloses one of the signals she sold in period 1, say s j1 = v + j1 (i.e. the analyst chooses at random which signal to communicate to the market). In a large market each trader assigns zero probability to the event that his signal will be made public. Therefore, in order to determine the price of information in this setup we can focus on the equilibrium in which each trader i ∈ [0, 1] anticipates observing a (public) signal s j1 , j = i at the beginning of period 2.
Proposition 13 In the 2-period competitive market with disclosure, there exists a unique linear equilibrium. The equilibrium is symmetric and given by X i1 (s 1 , p 1 ) =
Proof. See the appendix. QED Information disclosure does not change the nature of the strategies that traders adopt in the no-disclosure equilibrium. On the other hand, it improves the market maker's estimation. While in the no-disclosure model second period public precision is given by Var[
2 , in the model with disclosure
the precision incorporated in the public signal 25 Assuming a richer information structure does not help. For, suppose the analyst knew v + w with w ∼ N (0, τ −1 w ) and independent from all the other random variables in the model. Then, first period signals would take the form s i1 = v +w + i1 . The analyst could therefore disclose the average signal at interim (i.e.s 1 = 1 0 s i1 di = v + w) without making the equilibrium fully revealing. Such a strategy would, however, again prevent the sale of any further signal, since s i2 = v + w + i2 would be a noisier signal than the one the analyst disclosed. As a consequence, no trader would be ready to buy it.
increases the quality of the public forecast. This, in turn, affects the price each trader is willing to pay in order to buy both signals:
A straightforward calculation shows then thatφ n < φ n , n = 1, 2. Therefore,
Proposition 14
The analyst never finds it profitable to publicly disclose information in the second period.
The intuition is as follows: second period information disclosure has two effects. First, it reduces the added value that the first period signal has in the second period, in this way making more desirable the acquisition of further information in the second period:
However, at the same time it also reduces the uncertainty over the asset value v, and thus the gross informational advantage that traders acquire when they buy a new signal. 27 This, in turn, reduces traders' value for new information:
The latter effect is always stronger than the former. Hence, with information disclosure the maximum price the analyst can extract for s i2 is lower.
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Remark 4 Propositions 8, 12, and 14 show that while the analyst's and the durable goods monopolist's problem share various common features, they also display a number of differences. First, note that as opposed to the durable goods producer, the 26 Notice that this effect reduces the price a trader is willing to pay to buy the first signal. 27 See footnote 17. 28 The result in proposition 14 is robust to a different information structure. Assuming that traders receive the same signal in every period (with Admati and Pfleiderer's 1986 terminology, considering the dynamic "newsletters" model) leads exactly to the same conclusion. In this model the case against information disclosure is even stronger, for the anticipation of a useless first period signal in the second period makes traders unwilling to pay any extra amount in order to buy it. Computations for this case are available upon request.
analyst does not produce the fundamental information on which the signals she sells are based. In other words, she only transforms a raw-material whose production is located at the upstream level. As a consequence, the strategy of accelerating the first period signal decay also impacts on her ability to sell further signals in the future. This, in turn, implies that a policy of increasing such a rate of decay through public disclosure is never profitable.
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Also, differently from a durable goods monopolist, the analyst finds it optimal to serve the whole market in both periods. Indeed, segmenting the first period information market relaxes second period competition but also reduces the profits the analyst reaps from first period traders. According to proposition 12 the latter effect is always stronger than the former.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have argued that as fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good, the effects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. A monopolistic analyst selling information in a dynamic market tackles an intertemporal self-competition problem that leads her to partially release the control over the information flow to traders. Conversely, an insider acts "as if" he would rent the information he possesses to the market, thus securing a tighter control over the information flow. As a result, for a given piece of information, a market where information is provided by an analyst is deeper and more efficient than one where information is transmitted by an insider.
A number of issues are left for future research. Among these, competition between different analysts deserves special consideration. Indeed, in a static market, competition among analysts may lower the pressure to provide signals of a better quality (Simonov 1999) . To be sure, when signals are correlated, traders may place a higher value in holding the signal bundle. This, in turn, relaxes competition, allowing the analysts to reduce the precision they embed in their signals. As a consequence, traders base their strategies on information of a lower quality, potentially negatively affecting the properties of the underlying stock market. In a dynamic market, on the 29 Keeping the analogy with the durable-goods monopolist literature, publicly disclosing a signal is akin to the strategy of an artist who, to convince buyers that future production will be limited, makes a litograph and destroys the plates (see Bulow 1982) . Notice, however, that by doing so the artist does not affect the value of the durable good. Conversely, as argued above, information disclosure reduces the value of the "good" the analyst can sell in the future.
other hand, the intertemporal competition effect I uncover will still be there, accelerating the resolution of the underlying uncertainty. Therefore, the overall impact of competition on market quality will depend on the interplay between the competitionstifling effect due to signal complementarity, and the competition-enhancing effect due to the long-lived nature of information.
A related issue refers to the properties of a market where either competing analysts or multiple insiders provide information. In the latter case the existing literature has shown that the effect of competition on market quality depends on the correlation structure of the insiders' information and on the possibility of coordination.
30 This suggests that the comparison between the properties of a market where competing analysts provide information and one with multiple insiders should heavily depend on the posited information structure.
Also, in the paper I have assumed that the decision to trade on or sell privileged information is exogenous. However, the paper's main result raises the issue of why information sales occur at all in financial markets. In other words, one may wonder why the analyst does not find a way to internalize the negative effect of excessive speculation so to exploit more efficiently her information. For example, she could choose either to directly act as an insider, or (for instance if faced with a capital constraint) to indirectly sell her information by setting up a mutual fund. In addressing this issue, however, one may want to consider as well the benefits of direct information sales brought up by the literature. Indeed, Fishman and Hagerty (1995) argue that faced with informed competitors, an agent may use information sales as a commitment device to trade aggressively in the stock market. This strategy, in turn, secures the analyst a lager share of the reduced total market profits. 31 Also, Admati and Pfleiderer (1990) show that direct sales of information allow better surplus extraction vis-à-vis the set-up of a mutual fund, and may thus be preferred as a means to distribute information. 32 A formal analysis of the conditions under which the cost 30 Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993a) show that increasing the number of strategic, informed traders accelerates price discovery in a Kyle (1985) market. However, competition can be dampened both when insiders hold different, correlated signals (Foster and Viswanathan 1996) and if the coordination properties of public disclosure are exploited (Huddart, Hughes, and Levine 2005) .
31 According to my model, dynamic sales should strengthen this competitive effect, potentially providing a further reason for information sales to occur. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation of my analysis.
32 Kane and Marks (1990) also compare direct sales of information to the establishment of a mutual fund, proving that the existence of a borrowing constraint makes the analyst always prefer the former way to deliver information to the latter. In their framework, however, information sales do not affect of direct information sales brought up by my model is offset either by their strategic benefit, or by the enhanced surplus-extraction ability they allow, is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
Finally, the paper focuses on the single asset case. As traders typically hold portfolios of assets, a natural application of the present work is to the analysis of the multi-security case.
33 I leave this and other extensions for further investigation.
the value of the analyst's signal. 33 See Admati (1985) , Caballé and Krishnan (1994), and Cespa (2004) for static models of stock markets where traders exchange vectors of assets.
Proof of proposition 6.
Start from the second period. Owing to the assumption of a CARA utility function and the normality of the random variables, a trader's expected utility from using the signal she bought in period 1 (together with first and second period equilibrium prices)
On the other hand if the trader chooses to acquire the second period signal as well, her expected utility is given by
Using a standard result from normal theory (see e.g., Danthine and Moresi 1992) , prior to deciding whether or not to buy s i2 , the expected utility the trader earns in the first case is given by
1/2 , whereas in the second case
Therefore, denoting with φ 2 (s i2 ||s i1 , p 1 , p 2 ) the maximum price the trader is willing to pay in order to acquire s i2 once she has already acquired the first signal, the trader's certainty equivalent for the second period signal is given by the solution of
In the first period a trader that buys s i1 , uses it in both period 1 and 2, and plans to buy s i2 earns an expected utility given by
, whereas a trader that plans to buy no signal makes zero expected profits (as the information she ends up holding coincides with the one of the market makers that, under the competitive assumption earn zero profits). Therefore, the maximum price a trader is willing to pay for using the first period signal in period one is given by
However, the trader can also use the same signal in period two, insofar as it allows him to have an informational advantage vis-à-vis market makers independently from buying the second signal. The expected utility the trader expects to earn from ob-
which compared with the expected utility he earns only observing equilibrium prices
.
QED
Proof of proposition 7. Given traders' willingness to pay, the analyst is faced with the problem of choosing the optimal sequence of signals' precisions {τ * φ(s i2 ||s i1 , p 1 , p 2 )di.
The first order condition for the second period signal precision is given by
and its unique positive solution gives τ * 2 = (1/γ) τ iC1 /τ u . To see that this solution is a maximum, let F 1 (τ 2 ) = τ C2 + τ 1 . Then (7.7) can be rewritten as follows:
Differentiating the previous expression with respect to τ 2 gives
and evaluating it at optimum (∂ψ
). As one can check, the sign of the above expression is always negative, and the proposed solution is indeed a maximum.
Consider now the first period. Using τ * 2 the analyst's objective function becomes
Then, as one can check, (γ/2)(∂ ln(τ iC1 /τ C1 )/∂τ 1 ) and with For the first part, notice that
iC1 τ 1 and as all of the terms of the previous expression are increasing in τ 1 , the pointτ 1 is unique. Now, evaluating F ((1/γ) τ v /(3τ u )) > 0, hence it must be thatτ 1 < (1/γ) τ v /(3τ u ) < τ * 1 and as for any τ 1 >τ 1 , G(τ 1 ) > 0, the result follows.
To see that φ 1 (τ * 1 ) > φ(τ ), notice that
, and its unique maximum coincides with the one of the static information market, i.e.
a condition which is always satisfied. Next, to see that φ 2 (τ * 1 ) < φ(τ ), notice that
, and a direct comparison with φ(τ ) gives the desired result. For the second part, notice that λ C1 (τ * To see that λ C (τ ) > λ C1 (τ * 1 ), notice thatτ > τ * 1 and as for τ ≤τ , λ C1 (·) increases in τ , the result follows.
Proof of proposition 9.
Given the expressions for the equilibrium parameters, start from the second part of the claim. To see that λ I2 > λ C2 (τ * 1 ), notice that given τ * 2 , λ C2 = (τ C1 + τ iC1 ) −1 (τ u τ iC1 ) 1/2 , hence (∂λ C2 /∂τ 1 ) < 0 and λ C2 (τ * 1 ) < λ C2 ((1/γ)(τ v /3τ u )). Thus, as one can check, λ C2 ((1/γ)(τ v /3τ u )) < λ I2 . Next, β 2 = (1/2λ I2 ) < (1/2λ C2 ), while Letting F = (2γ 2 (τ C3 + 2 t=1 τ t )) −1 a 2 2 , the argument in the above exponential can be rewritten as follows:
2 + ((X i2 /γ) + 2F (µ−s i2 ))(p 3 − µ)
where p 3 − µ is normally distributed (conditionally on {s i2 , p 2 }) with mean zero and variance Σ (i.e. µ = E[p 3 |s i2 , p 2 ]), where
Using a standard property of normal random variables, it can be shown that (7.11) is equal to (Σ −1 + 2F ) −1/2 Σ −1/2 times − exp − µ 2 F + ((X i2 /2)− 2Fs i2 )µ + Fs 2 i2 −(X i2 /γ)p 2 ) (7.12) −(1/2)((X i2 /γ) − 2F (s i2 − µ)) 2 Σ −1 + 2F
−1
The first order condition to maximize (7.12) with respect to X i2 yields X i2 = γ (µ − p 2 ) Σ −1 + 2F + 2F (s i2 − µ) , (7.13) and using the above expressions for µ and Σ one finds that X i2 (s i2 , p 2 ) = a 2 (s i2 − p 2 ). (7.14) Substituting (7.13) in (7.12), rearranging and using (7.14)
E[U (X i2 (p 3 − p 2 ) + X i3 (v − p 3 ))|{s i2 , p 2γ 2 τ iC2 (s i2 − p 2 ) 2 .
Finally, computing the ex-ante expected utility yields
Analogously one can find that X i2 (s i1 , p 2 ) = a 1 (s i1 − p 2 ) and that
Therefore, the value of s i2 in period 2 is given by φ(s i2 ||s i1 , p 2 ) = γ 2 ln τ iC2 τ C2 + τ 1 .
15)
The price of the second period signal is then obtained summing (7.10) and (7.15):
Along the same lines of what done for φ 2 one finds that
QED
Proof of proposition 12.
Starting from the second period, the analyst solves Consider now the analyst's first period objective function:
Notice that for τ i2 = τ * i2 , the above is a function of τ i1 . Also, given that τ C1 = τ v + ( τ Cn τ In , n
